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Abstract
We show that dierences in market participants risk aversion can generate
herd behavior in stock markets where assets are traded sequentially. This in turn
prevents learning of market's fundamentals. These results are obtained without
introducing multidimensional uncertainty or transaction cost. (JEL: G1, G14, C11,
D82)
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1 Introduction
The literature on rational herding pioneering by Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and Welch
(1992) and Banerjee (1992) among others, proves that sequential interaction of rational
investors can generate imitative behavior (herding) that prevents learning of the econ-
omy's fundamentals. However, in the herding models transaction prices are exogenous
and constant, therefore their predictions cannot be directly extended to stock markets.
To what extent the endogeneity of trading prices in nancial markets can prevent herding
phenomena and guarantee full information aggregation?
Avery and Zemsky (1998) (AZ henceforth) and Lee (1998) study the occurrence
of herding in stock markets when trading is sequential and prices are endogenous. AZ
show that the presence of multidimensional uncertainty, in the short run can generate
herd behavior as well as large dierences between an asset's trading price and its funda-
mental value. Nevertheless, in the long run all these phenomena vanish and all private
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information is eventually incorporated into prices. Lee (1998) shows that the presence
of an exogenous transaction cost leads to information aggregation failure.
Within a simple sequential trade model, we show that herding, contrarian behavior
1
and information aggregation failure can occur even in the absence of both multidimen-
sional uncertainty and transaction cost. Dierently from AZ, in our model traders and
market makers interpret past histories in the same way. Nevertheless, when market
makers and traders dier in their risk aversion, the same information aects market
makers' quotes and traders' valuations dierently. This is suÆcient to generate herding,
contrarian behaviors, long run informational ineÆciency and mispricing.
2 The economy
We consider a sequential trade model similar to Glosten and Milgrom (1985): a risky
asset is exchanged for money among market makers and traders. At each trading period,
a randomly selected trader has a unique opportunity to buy or sell one unit of the asset
at the most attractive ask (A
t
) or bid price (B
t
) respectively. Prices are competitively
posted by market makers. We denote with v = V + " the liquidation value of the asset,
where " has a normal distribution N(0; ) with  > 0, V 2 fV ; V g with V < V and
Pr(V = V ) = 
0
. V and " are independently distributed. Each trader receives a
private signal s 2 fl; hg with Pr(s =ljV = V ) = Pr(s =hjV =V ) = p 2 (
1
2
; 1). Signals
are conditionally i.i.d. across traders and independent from ". Note that we have
V < E[vjs = l] < E[v] < E[vjs = h] < V .
Let H
t
be the history of trade (past quantities and prices) up to date t   1. All
agents observe H
t
and update their beliefs according to Bayes' rule. We denote 
t
=
Pr

V =V jH
t

. We denote 
s
t
= Pr

V =V jH
t
; s

, s 2 fh; lg, an informed traders' belief
at time t. A trader's action A 2 fbuy; sell; no tradeg is said to be not informative
at date t if it does not aect the public belief: Pr

V =V jH
t
;A

= 
t
. Note that
the learning process in the economy regards only the realization of V and not ", still
E [vjH
t
] = E [VjH
t
].
Risk averse agents of our economy have utility function u(vx+m) =  e
 (vx+m)
,
where x and m are respectively the amount of risky asset (inventory henceforth) and
money in his portfolio. We denote with  (resp. ) the agent's buy (resp. sell) reservation
price that corresponds to the asset's price such that this agent is indierent between
buying (resp. selling) one asset or not trading at all. The reservation prices for a risk
averse agents whose initial inventory is x and that attaches probability  to the event
fV =V g are
(; x) =
1

 
 
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2
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V x
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V x
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+ (1  )e
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V (x+1)
!!
; (1)
(; x) =
1
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See next section for a precise denition of these behaviors.
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We adopt exactly the same denition of herding, contrarian behavior and informa-
tional cascade as in Avery and Zemsky (1998):
A trader with private signal s engages in buy (sell) herding behavior if: (i) initially
he strictly prefers not to buy (resp. not to sell); (ii) after observing a positive history of
trades H
t
, i.e. 
t
> 
0
(resp. negative history, i.e. 
t
< 
0
), he strictly prefers to buy
(resp. sell).
A trader engages in buy (sell) contrarian behavior if: (i) initially he strictly prefers
not to buy (resp. not to sell); (ii) after observing a negative (resp. positive) history of
trades H
t
, he strictly prefers to buy (resp. sell).
An informational cascade occurs when the actions of all informed traders are not
informative.
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Suppose rst that market makers are risk neutral and traders are risk
averse. Then, in any given period t, the competition among market makers leads to
bid and ask quotes (B
t
; A
t
) that are equal to the expectation of v conditional to the
information provided by the past and current trades. If time-t-trader has signal s and
inventory x, then he will buy if (
s
t
; x)  A
t
, he will sell if (
s
t
; x)  B
t
and he will
not trade elsewhere.
Proposition 1 A trader whose inventory is bounded away from  1=2 and 1=2 will en-
gage in herd or contrarian behavior with positive probability. Moreover, if there is a zero
probability that a trader's inventory is close to either 1=2 or  1=2, then an informational
cascade occurs almost surely.
Suppose now that traders are risk neutral and market makers are risk
averse. Consider market maker i at time t, and let B
i
t
, A
i
t
and x
i
t
be his bid and ask
reservation prices and his inventory respectively. Taking into account the information
provided by the trade at time t, we have:
A
i
t
= (Pr(V = V jH
t
; buy); x
i
t
),
B
i
t
= (Pr(V = V jH
t
; sell); x
i
t
).
We assume for simplicity that there are just two market makers, that they are sym-
metrically informed and behave myopically. Then, following Ho and Stoll (1983), in
equilibrium, it results A
t
= maxfA
1
t
; A
2
t
g and B
t
= minfB
1
t
; B
2
t
g. If time-t-trader has
signal s, then he will buy if E[VjH
t
; s]  A
t
, sell if E[VjH
t
; s] < B
t
and he will not
trade elsewhere.
Proposition 2 If market makers' inventories are bounded away from
1
2
and  
1
2
then,
eventually all traders take the same action. Consequently an informational cascade oc-
curs, and traders engage in herding or contrarian behavior with positive probability.
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Note that if an informational cascade never occurs, then 
t
eventually converges to 1 (resp. to 0)
for V = V (resp. V = V ).
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3 Discussion
As a general rule, herd or contrarian behavior and informational cascade occur when
market makers' quotes and traders valuations for the asset react dierently to an history
of trade. In our model this happens because of the dierence in risk aversion between
dealers and traders. Take for example, a positive history that increases 
t
. As 
t
approaches 1 a risk neutral agent's valuation for the asset converges to V . By contrast,
a risk averse agent's buy and sell reservation prices will converge toward levels that
are in general dierent from V . If market makers are risk neutral and traders are risk
averse, then expressions (1) and (2) imply that when 
t
is close to 1 (or to 0) all traders
whose inventory is x <  
1
2
, x 2 ( 
1
2
;
1
2
), or x >
1
2
will sell, not trade or buy the asset
respectively no matter their signal. Thus, a trader who initially would have sold the asset,
and whose x >
1
2
, will engage in buy herding behavior after a suÆciently long positive
history. If market makers are risk averse and traders are risk neutral, then expressions
(1) and (2), imply that when 
t
is close to 1 all traders will buy (resp. sell) the asset if
A
t
< V , i.e., minfx
1
t
; x
2
t
g > 1=2 (resp. B
t
> V , i.e., maxfx
1
t
; x
2
t
g <  
1
2
) no matter the
signal they received. Thus, a trader who initially would have sold the asset will engage
in buy herding with positive probability. Note also that when the inventory of all risk
averse agents in the economy (dealers or traders) is bounded away form  1=2 or 1=2
then eventually all traders order will not be informative and an informational cascade
occurs. In the presence of an informational cascade, when traders are risk averse the bid-
ask spread is equal to zero and prices are steady, by contrast spread continues to evolve
when market makers are risk averse as quotes move for inventory purposes even when
trades do not conceal any new information. For this reason an informational cascade
never ends when market makers are risk neutral, whereas it might end if market makers
are risk averse. In a related paper (Decamps and Lovo (2003)) we show that information
aggregation failure does not relay on the restriction to CARA utility functions nor on
the assumption that agents can just choose the sign of their trade but not its size.
Appendix
Proposition 1 and 2 are direct consequences of the following Lemma
Lemma 1 Take 
t
is suÆciently close to 1 or to 0, and let x > 1=2 and x
0
<  1=2.
Then for any triple of signals s, s
0
and s
00
it results
(
s
t
; x) < E[V jH
t
; s
0
] < (
s
00
t
; x
0
);
(
s
t
; x) < E[V jH
t
; s
0
] < (
s
00
t
; x
0
):
Proof : First, as 
l
t
=

t
(1 p)

t
(1 p)+(1 
t
)p
and 
h
t
=

t
p

t
p+(1 
t
)(1 p)
, 
s
t
is continuous
in 
t
. Second, from expressions (1) and (2),  and  are continuous in . Third,
(1;
1
2
) = (1; 
1
2
) = V ; (0;
1
2
) = (0; 
1
2
) = V and  and  are decreasing in x. The
result follows then from an easy continuity argument .
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Proofs of Propositions 1 and 2: Without loss of generality we reason with sell
orders. Take an informed trader who strictly prefer not to sell at date 0. Assume rst that
the trader is risk averse with inventory x
0
<  
1
2
whereas dealers are risk neutral. From
lemma 1, as 
t
is suÆciently close to 0, we have (
s
t
; x
0
) > B
t
for s 2 fl; hg. Thus, our
trader will engage in sell herding and his trade will not be informative. Second, suppose
the trader is risk neutral and dealers are risk averse. If at date t, the public belief

t
is close to 0 and dealers inventories satisfy max(x
1
t
; x
2
t
) <  
1
2
then, from lemma 1,
B
t
= minfB
1
t
; B
2
t
g > E[V jH
t
; s] for s 2 fl; hg and the trader will engage in sell herding.
Once again trades are not informative. Similarly, 
t
close to 1 leads to sell contrarian
behavior. Using an analogous argument it can be easily checked that if all risk averse
agents' inventories are bounded away from
1
2
and  
1
2
then, as soon as 
t
is close to 1
or to 0, trades are not informative and therefore an informational cascade occurs almost
surely.
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